This paper studies the efficient arrangement among several agents that are subject to idiosyncratic, privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption. Agents accumulate capital and have access to a technology to produce goods. The framework deviates from previous literature, which assumed that (i) there is a continuum of agents and (ii) agents are exogenously endowed with output every period with no investment opportunities. A new method is proposed to solve for the optimal allocation that takes advantage of the fact that the utility possibility set is convex. Pareto weights play the role of promised utility in Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990). The method is applied to study efficiency in a partnership between the founder, who faces the taste shock, and the partner, who provides funds but do not face shocks. New insights are derived. Under private information the ownership structure determines to what extent private information matters. If the founder's share of the partnership is too big his incentives to cheat vanish. Additionally, efficiency implies that, while incentive constraints bind, equity shares must fluctuate to alleviate information problems. In the long run, there are two possible extreme structures: (1) the founder's equity share becomes sufficiently large to make the incentive problem irrelevant and (2) the founder's equity share converges to zero. Two alternative economies are studied to understand the role of key assumptions: (i) an endowment economy and (ii) an economy in which both partners face taste shocks. It turned out that to obtain the main results allowing for a production economy is crucial but having only one agent with shock is not.
Introduction
This paper studies the efficient arrangement among several agents that are subject to idiosyncratic, privately observed taste shocks that affect their marginal utility of current consumption. Agents have access to a freely available constant return to scale technology to produce goods and also to a linear technology to accumulate capital through investment. Solving this class of problems with standard methods is troublesome. An alternative method is proposed that takes advantage of the fact that the utility possibility set is convex to iterate directly on the frontier. The environment deviates from previous literature, which assumed that (i) there is a continuum of agents and (ii) agents are exogenously endowed with output every period with no investment opportunities. These two assumptions, although appealing for certain applications as dynamic public finance, are less suitable for other problems. In this paper the method is applied to study the problem of a partnership designing financial and investment policies.
A New Recursive Method. The problem of incentive compatibility is solved in this environment by conditioning consumption and investment on aggregate capital, on current reports of the taste shocks, and on the history of members' past reports. Capital accumulation complicates the analysis. Solving this problem with the method developed by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) , APS hereafter, would imply iterating on utility possibility correspondence, instead of functions. The value function (and the corresponding policy functions) would be recovered from the frontier of the fixed point of that operator on correspondences. But while theoretically feasible, 1 a method that bases on iterations on correspondences makes the computation very demanding. This may explain why there are so few cases where APS is numerically implemented. 2 The method proposed here overcomes these difficulties by characterizing the efficient frontier of a convex utility possibility correspondence by means of welfare weights attached to each agent. The efficient allocation determines a law of motion of these parameters through continuation welfare weights. They play a role that is isomorphic to the continuation utilities in APS. The idea of substituting utility levels with welfare weights is borrowed from Lucas and Stokey (1984) 's analysis of optimal growth with many consumers. These weights become endogenous state variables that summarize the history. This approach complements the standard methods pioneered by the seminal work of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) .
Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships.
What is the efficient arrangement between members of a partnership? The key premise here is the tradeoff between (i) the need for more partners to become investors by providing extra funds to the founder (and so alleviate the fluctuations in investment) and (ii) the incentive problems generated by the diffusion of ownership. To illustrate the essence of this conflict, consider a sole proprietorship (the founder) that operates a freely available constant return to scale technology (the project).
Funding of the project is subject to the availability of resources that the only owner of the business can supply. Shocks that affect the opportunity cost of resources available to the owner (in our case taste shocks to his needs of consumption) will be reflected in fluctuations in the marginal product of capital. This implies that in certain periods the firm's marginal product of capital will be high and so it would be beneficial to increase investment by means of an external investor. The formation of a two-agent partnership between the founder and the external investor alleviates this problem but introduces incentive problems. Suppose that the founder privately observes the taste shock that determines his liquidity needs. For simplicity, suppose that the external investor does not face shocks, so that he can alleviate fluctuations in investment in the partnership. These two partners manipulate both the financial and investment policies of the partnership to maximize their own well-being. Every period the founder must report the taste shock and both partners decide, on one side, how to split current output between dividend payout and investment-the investment policy-and, on the other side, how to distribute current dividends and future shares-the financial policy.
If the founder's shocks are privately observable, the financial and investment policies must provide incentives for truthful revelation of the shock. The design of these policies and its implications are the object of study here.
If liquidity shocks are perfectly observable, the solution to this problem is simple. The optimal arrangement for the partnership prescribes that the firm dividend payout is distributed among partners according to a simple function of each owner share of the partnership and the value of the taste shock. Importantly, the share of the firm owned by each partner is in-dependent of the realization of the shock and the stock of capital (i.e., the optimal ownership structure does not change over time).
In contrast, if liquidity shocks are private information, the ownership structure of the partnership becomes critical. First, the ownership structure determines to which extent private information matters. In particular, there is a threshold for the amount of equity shares held by the founder: for levels above that threshold, private information doesn't matter. To understand this result, notice that part of the increase in the consumption of the founder that comes after a high liquidity shock is from reducing the consumption of his partner. Call that redistribution. There is an additional source to finance the same increase in consumption: disinvestment. Disinvestment is the drop in capital accumulation that occurs after the founder reports a high liquidity shock. Interestingly, in the unconstrained optimal arrangement, the fraction of the increase in the founder's consumption that is financed through disinvestment is increasing in his equity share. If the founder chooses to misreport, he will be obtaining more consumption today at the cost of inducing underinvestment in the firm.
This provides incentives for truthful revelation: As his equity share increases, eventually the cost of misreporting is not offset the benefits.
The second feature concerns the dynamics of the ownership structure. When designing the investment and financial policies, it is optimal to make equity shares fluctuate to alleviate information problems. If the founder's equity share is below the threshold mentioned above, whenever he reports a high (low) shock, he gets a larger share of dividends in exchange for a lower (higher) equity share for the future. Thus, under private information the optimal ownership structure fluctuates over time to provide the right incentives as long as ownership is not sufficiently concentrated.
Third, this theory provides important insights about the long-run consequences of private information. In the long run, the ownership structure of partnerships is such that private information does not matter. There are two possible extreme structures that achieve this outcome, though. On the one hand, for a sufficiently large sequence of low shocks, the founder's equity shares becomes sufficiently large to make the incentive problem irrelevant (i.e., incentives to misreport disappear). When that level of concentration is reached, the ownership structure remains unchanged for ever and private information doesn't matter.
In contrast, if the founder is hit by a sufficiently large sequence of high shocks, his share in the firm converges to zero; i.e., the ownership structure is concentrated in the partner.
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Notice that in both cases the ownership structure is concentrated. This is in line with the description of corporate ownership around the world in Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) . The last section of the paper analyzes how long-run predictions about the ownership structure are modified when both agents have taste shocks that are privately observed. In that case, there is a new ownership structure at which the partnership may converge. For certain parametrization, when the ownership is equally distributed across the owners, both of them are large shareholders that do not have incentive to misreport. As a consequence, when both agents face privately observed taste shocks, an equally distributed ownership structure may also emerge as the long-run outcome.
Related Literature. Pioneering contributions in the literature on constrained efficient allocations with private information abstracted from capital accumulation, as their main goal has been to study wealth distribution. In pure exchange economy settings, Green (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987) , Thomas and Worral (1990) , and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) show that (constrained) efficient allocations, independent of the feasibility technologies, display extreme levels of "immiserization": The expected utility level of (almost) every agent in the economy converges to the lower bound with probability one. The long-run analysis presented in this paper shows that with capital accumulation this result might not hold. This is clear in the last section, where the analysis here is modified by assuming that the partnership is a tree that produces a given number of fruits every period. In that case, reporting a high liquidity shock implies a transfer of resources among agents that does not affect how many fruits will be produced in the future. There, regardless of the equity share of the founder, he will always have incentive to misreport the costs of funding if incentives are not explicitly considered. As a consequence, the economy must converge to "immiserization" of the founder in the long run.
In an early contribution that includes capital accumulation, Marcet and Marimon (1992) examine a two-agent model where a risk-neutral investor with unlimited resources invests in the technology of a risk-averse producer whose output is subject to privately observed productivity shocks. They show that the full information investment policy can be implemented in the private information environment. A risk-neutral investor can make the risk-averse entrepreneur follow the full information investment policy and allocate his consumption conditional on output realizations. Thus, they find that growth levels are as high as they are with perfect information. Along the same lines, Khan and Ravikumar (2001) impose a period-by-period feasibility constraint and endogenous growth. In particular, they examine the impact of incomplete risk-sharing on growth and welfare in the context of the AK model. The source of market incompleteness is private information since household technologies are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks not observable by others.
Risk-sharing between households occurs through contracts with intermediaries. This sort of incomplete risk-sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risksharing benchmark. However, "numerical examples indicate that, on average, the growth and welfare effects on incomplete risk sharing are likely to be small." Notice that in both Marcet and Marimon (1992) and Khan and Ravikumar (2001) the shadow price of capital is exogenous. The key simplification in Marcet and Marimon (1992) is that the second agent in the economy is risk-neutral and has access to unlimited resources. In the case of Khan and Ravikumar (2001) , the key assumption is that the production function is linear in the stock of capital.
In a recent contribution, Sleet and Yeltekin (2010) study the long-run outcomes implied by the efficient allocation under private information in a model in which the shadow price of capital is endogenous. Their analysis is in the tradition of the "new dynamic public finance" literature, with i.i.d. shocks, log preferences, Cobb-Douglas technology, and full depreciation of capital. They find that some fraction of agents is absorbed into "misery" with the rest "retiring into luxury." We share with them the fact that the shadow price of capital is endogenous. We show that, with a small number of agents, the long-run outcomes may be different.
In a recent contribution, Clementi, Cooley, and Giannatale (2010) study the efficient arrangement between an investor and an entrepreneur in a venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. They find that the framework generates a rationale for firm decline. This happens because incentive provision becomes costlier as the entrepreneur gets wealthier. This leads to a decline in the entrepreneurs' optimal level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment. This framework is closely related to the analysis here because they consider the problem between two agents and there is capital accumulation. However, in their framework the source of the information friction is different and the investor is assumed to be risk-neutral. In the framework presented here the optimal arrangement does not induce the decline of the partnership.
Model
Consider an infinite-horizon production economy with one sector. The economy is populated by I (types) of infinitely lived heterogeneous agents, with representative agent i ∈ {1, ..., I}.
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, .... There is only one consumption good, which can be either consumed or invested.
Preferences and Technologies
A standard constant-returns-to-scale production function, F , represents the aggregate technology. Aggregate output is given by F (K, L), where K is the current stock of capital and L denotes units of labor. Agent i is endowed with one unit of time each period and does not value leisure; i.e., the time endowment is supplied inelastically in the labor market. The initial stock of capital at date 0 is denoted by K 0 > 0. Given the technological assumptions, there exists some K > 0 such that X = [0, K] denotes the sustainable levels of capital. Capital depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
At the beginning of date t, agent i privately observes an idiosyncratic preference shock s i,t ∈ S t = {s L , s H }, where s H > s L . This shock is assumed to be i.i.d. across time and agents, where π(s i,t ) > 0 is the probability of s i,t . Let s t = (s 1,t , ..., s I,t ) be the aggregate preference shock at date t with probability π(s t ) =
S t denotes the aggregate history of events from date 0 to date t. The probability at date 0 of any particular history s t is given by π(s t ) = π(s 0 )...π(s t ).
Given a consumption path {c
where u : R + → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable; lim ct→0 u ′ (c t ) = +∞; and β ∈ (0, 1).
Optimal Allocation
To solve for the optimal arrangement, consider a fictitious planner that allocates optimally incentive compatible allocations that are feasible within the economy.
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At date t, agent i has privately observed the partial history s
represent agent i's reporting strategy, where z i,t : S t → S t for all t. Denote z = (z 1 , ..., z I ) the aggregate reporting strategy. Let z * i be the truthtelling reporting strategy for which z * i (s t i ) = s i,t for all t and s
be an investment rule that every period allocates next-period capital, given a history of aggregate reports; i.e. K t+1 :
be a utility transfer where
To interpret this, consider any aggregate realization s t up to date t and any aggregate reporting strategy z. Agent i's consumption at date t is given by u
Similarly, the stock of capital at date t+1 will be given
satisfying these properties is called a sequential allocation.
Let s t−1 be any arbitrary aggregate partial history reported. Let z be an aggregate continuation reporting strategy from period t onward. Given a sequential allocation (V, K ′ ), agent i's utility at date t is
where z ′ (s) is the continuation reporting strategy from period t + 1 onward induced by z when the first element s is kept constant. When t = 0, we write
The following definition says that an allocation is incentive compatible if truthtelling is the best response for every agent. Let s −i = (s 1, ..., s i−1 , s i+1 , ..., s I ) be an aggregate preference shock that excludes agent i's element.
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Definition 2 (Incentive Compatibility) Given K ∈ X, a sequential allocation (V, K ′ ) is incentive compatible if, for all agent i, for all t ≥ 0, all s t−1 , and any continuation z
This can be interpreted as the natural extension of Bayesian implementation for this particular dynamic environment, which differs from the related literature as mentioned in the Introduction. Note that Definition 2 takes into account that agents can choose a continuation reporting strategy every period after they have observed their own preference shock histories. The restriction of analyzing incentive-compatible allocations is without loss of generality since it can be shown that the relevant version of the celebrated Revelation Principle holds.
Let Ψ(K) be the utility possibility correspondence for this economy. That is,
Later, we show that Ψ(K) is convex for all K ∈ X and the set of efficient allocations can be parameterized by welfare weights θ ∈ R
for some θ ∈ R I + . The next Lemma shows that the utility possibility correspondence is convex-valued, a result that is key for applying our alternative characterization.
The next result is a direct consequence of Lemma 1. It shows that the set of efficient allocations can be parameterized by welfare weights.
Corollary 1 (Welfare Weights Representation) The set of efficient allocations can be parameterized by welfare weights θ ∈ R I + . That is, (V * , K ′ * ) is efficient if and only if (V * , K ′ * ) is the corresponding allocation that solves
for some θ ∈ R I + .
The next Lemma is one of the key steps to make our alternative approach computationally simpler, and it is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1.
Lemma 2 (Continuation Utility Constraint) w ∈ Ψ(K) if and only if w ≥ 0 and
h is continuous and h < ∞}. be the set of continuous and bounded function mapping X × R I + into R + ,while F H ≡ {h ∈ F : f is HOD 1 in θ} denotes its subset of functions, which are homogeneous of degree one (HOD 1) with respect to θ. Consider the metric induced by . and observe that (F H , . ) is a closed subset of the Banach space (F, . ) and, consequently, a Banach space itself.
subject to
for all (s i , s i ) and
Let W(k) denote the constraint correspondence defined by (6) - (9) at any arbitrary initial
The intuition for this result can be interpreted as follows. If a function h is preserved under T , any value of h can also be attained by some feasible incentive-compatible recursive allocation. This allows one to choose the value of any feasible incentive-compatible recursive allocation and transform it period-by-period into a feasible incentive-compatible sequential allocation delivering those levels of utility.
Recursive Method
Let v, k ′ , w ′ denote the set of policy functions solving (5) - (9) while θ ′ denotes the corresponding continuation welfare weight. Given (k 0 , θ 0 ), we say that a set of policy functions
for all i and all (t, s t ) where K 0 is given.
is efficient at K 0 if and only if it is generated by the set of policy functions as (10).
Thus, the value of any plan that can be attained with a feasible incentive-compatible sequential allocation (V, K ′ ) can also be attained by delivering to each agent current utility for today and promising to each agent some contingent levels of expected utility from tomorrow on that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints, attached to the corresponding welfare weight.
Algorithm
The main goal is to provide an algorithm capable of finding the value function h * and its corresponding policy functions. Let h * * be the value function solving the recursive problem for which the incentive compatibility constraints are ignored while the corresponding operator is denoted T . Evidently, h
Proposition 3 (Computation) Let h 0 = h * * and denote h n = T n (h * * ) . Then, {h n } is a monotone decreasing sequence and lim n→∞ h n = h * .
The next Corollary follows because the operator T preserves concavity with respect to k and convexity with respect to θ. Differentiability follows from an application of BenvenisteScheinkman's theorem.
Corollary 2 h * is concave in k and convex in θ. Moreover, h * is differentiable in the interior of X × ∆ I−1 .
Now, since h * is convex and differentiable in θ, then (9) can be written
for all i.
The main gain of this method with respect to the traditional Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) approach is in terms of applicability and tractability. The approach identifies attainable levels of next-period utility by iterating directly on the efficient utility possibility frontier with no need of knowing the utility possibility correspondence a priori. This greatly simplifies the computational burden.
To understand the difficulty in numerically solving the problem using the APS approach, consider an alternative approach to state the dynamic program defined above in the simpler case of only two agents. Instead of parameterizing allocations with welfare weights, the planner chooses current feasible consumption, capital, and continuation utilities for both agents in order to maximize the utility of agent 1 subject to the following restrictions: (i) the utility of agent 2 is above some pre-specified level (the so-called promise-keeping constraint); (ii) allocations are period-by-period incentive compatible and (iii) continuation utility levels lie in the next-period utility possibility correspondence. In this case, the endogenous state variables that summarize the history stemming from private information are the utility levels themselves. The issue is that condition (iii) implies that continuation utilities must belong to the feasible set defined by the utility possibility correspondence. This implies computing correspondences. The work of Sleet and Yeltekin (2003) shows how difficult that task can be. Perhaps due to these difficulties, there are almost no examples in the literature that actually apply APS to solve the model numerically-an exception is Abraham and Pavoni (2008) .
Of course, the APS approach outperforms ours if one needs to consider a problem in which the utility possibility correspondence is not convex-valued. Indeed, our approach (at least as stated in this paper) is not appropriate to handle those problems.
Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships
The method developed above can be applied to shed light on the role of the ownership structure in the optimal arrangement between partners in a capital venture. The venture is owned by two individuals. Agent 1, also referred to as the founder, faces taste shocks that are privately observed. To make the case simple, agent 2, also referred to as the partner, does not face these shocks. Thus, the partner can potentially alleviate fluctuations in liquidity needs of the founder. The key simplification here is that only one agent is subject to the taste shocks. . How is the ownership structure determined? In exchange for their capital contributions, each partner gets a given weight in the designs of the financial and investment policies of the partnership. Going back to our notation, these values of lifetime utility will be represented recursively by w 1 (k, θ) and w 2 (k, θ), where θ represents the relative weight of agent 1. Given that there are constant returns to scale, the only benefit of creating the partnership is that they can potentially improve the allocation by providing liquidity to the agent with liquidity needs. Because of these gains, there will be a range of values of θ that makes both agents willing to participate in the partnership. One of those values will be the initial weight, or θ 0 . Which value in this range is selected will depend on the negotiation structure. For instance, if agent 1 makes a take or leave it offer, the value of θ will be the maximum in this interval.
First Best Allocation
The full information case reduces to the problem of a sole proprietorship with an investor with preferences featuring peculiar preference shocks. That is, the taste shock will be a weighted average of the taste shocks of both agents, although here the second agent's taste shock is constant at one.
To see this, notice that from the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions of the full information problem are
where C(s) denotes aggregate consumption and
for all i and all s. Notice that (13) follows from the first-order conditions with respect to w ′ (after normalization, ) and, importantly, it implies that welfare weights are kept constant. Indeed, this result holds more general for first best allocations and, in particular, it does not depend on CRRA preferences. The intuition behind keeping optimally constant the welfare weights can be grasped as follows. The planner's problem is an artificial device to characterize a particular set of allocations in which each welfare weight, θ i , is the ex-ante planner's valuation of delivering one more unit of expected discounted utility to agent i. Similarly, θ ′ i (s) is the valuation of delivering one more unit of expected discounted utility to agent i next period if today's shock is s. In the case of two agents, the ex-ante relative valuation is θ/(1 − θ). Consider now the relative valuation of delivering one unit of expected discounted utility next period after a realization of the shock s. In the first best case, this will be given by the ratio
and so the relative valuation remains unchanged.
When there is private information, on the other hand, future expected discounted utility plays an extra role since it provides incentives to truthfully report. Its valuation can vary as time and uncertainty unfold.
Observe that (11)- (13) imply that the problem reduces to choosing consumption and investment in a sole proprietorship with an aggregate investor with preferences at date t
i.e., an aggregate preference shock. An important observation is that this shock depends on the distributional parameter θ. It follows by standard arguments that investment is decreasing in S t , while aggregate consumption is increasing.
Relative Pareto Weight and Ownership Structure. In this context it is simple to see the relationship between the planner problem and the problem of a partnership. The total value of consumption, C(s), is the total value of dividends that the partnership pay out to the owners. Equation (11) shows that the relative Pareto weight of agent 1, θ, determines the share of those dividends that correspond to agent 1, according to the ratio,
Thus, the share of dividends that agent 1 receives is an increasing function of θ, and he receives zero if θ = 0 and all if θ = 1. Therefore, hereafter we interpret θ as the ownership share (or equity share) of the partnership that belongs to agent 1.
Constrained Efficient Allocation
Under certain conditions, the unconstrained efficient allocation can be implemented even if taste shocks are privately observed. The following result is used to characterize the conditions under which this occur.
Proposition 4 (Sole-Proprietorship is First Best) If θ = 1, then the First Best allocation is incentive compatible.
That is, in this case the only partner does not have any incentive to report untruthfully.
Corollary 3 (Too big to cheat) For each k, there exists some θ(k) ∈ (0, 1) for all (θ, k) where θ ∈ θ(k), 1 such that the unconstrained efficient allocation satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints.
This result follows by continuity of the policy function in the case without private information. It implies that for any level of the capital stock of the partnership, there is a value for the share of ownership of agent 1 (threshold value for θ) such that for higher values the full information allocation is incentive compatible. The intuition behind this result can be grasped as follows. If agent 1 gets large enough in the partnership, most of the consumption change occurred if he reports s H instead of s L is financed by reducing k ′ . This can heavily decrease the future utility of partner 1 himself and makes cheating undesirable.
Too Big to Cheat
It will be argued that one can always find a subset of welfare weights for which private information does not matter and so the constrained efficient allocation is indeed first best. Consider the first best policy function k ′ F B (θ, k, s L ) and k ′ F B (θ, k, s H ) and define the bounds of sustainable levels of capital as
Since policy functions are continuous, these bounds, k min (θ) and k max (θ), are both continuous
. Then the allocation is First Best in which θ t+n = θ t for all n ≥ 0.
The last result shows that once the partnership reaches a region in which: (i) the share of ownership of agent 1 is large enough and (2) the stock of capital of the partnership is between some bounds, then it will stay there forever.
Convergence
Now consider the evolution of welfare weights' ratios. Let S ∞ be the set of infinite sequences, with typical element s ∞ = {s 0 , ..., s t , ...}. Let {θ t } ∞ t=0 be the stochastic process for welfare weights generated by the set of policy functions solving (5); i.e., θ t : S ∞ → [0, 1] where θ t (s ∞ ) = θ(s) denotes a particular realization. It will be shown that the stochastic process of the ratio of welfare weights is a non-negative martingale.
Lemma 3 (Pareto Weights Dynamics)
The ratio of Pareto weights is a non-negative martingale; i.e., for all t and all s
.
Corollary 4 (Pareto Weights Convergence) It follows by the martingale convergence theorem that
Motivated by the results in our computed examples, suppose that θ(k) = θ * for all k.
Proposition 6 (Long-Run Convergence to First Best) The economy reaches a first best allocation with probability 1;
Thus, we have established that in the long-run the incentive compatibility constraint will not bind; either the weight of the agent with private information in the partnership is zero or is large enough that he has no incentives to misreport.
Numerical Implementation
In this section the results of solving for the optimal allocation with full and private information using the approach discussed above are presented. The main motivation for this section is to enrich our understanding of the economy with private information. Several economies will be computed to understand the role of specific assumptions: benchmark full information, benchmark private information, endowment economy with private information, and production economy with two agents with shocks.
For the benchmark economy, we set the the model's parameters as described in Table 1 . The values for the exponent in the production function are in line with literature, as it is the value of the depreciation rate. The utility function is CRRA with parameter σ = 1/2. This value is lower than what it is usual in macroeconomics but it is in line with other studies of private information as Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni (2003) . As it will be clear below, the calibration of the difference between s(L) and s(H) is important. The fact that there are only two values implies that the founder of the partnership cannot tell "small" lies; the taste shock it is either s(L) or s(H). Recall that the intuition for the "too big to cheat" is that the founder is discouraged from lying because it will distort the allocation of capital. That force is present as far as s(L) = s(H). But we expect that the larger the "lie" (or s(H) − s(L)), the smaller will be the threshold of θ for which agent 1 will have no incentive to misreport the shock.
Value and Policy Functions
The solution for function h * is shown in Figure 1 . It has the properties that were described in the theoretical characterization. The function h * is increasing and concave in the stock of capital. Additionally, this function is also convex in the relative weight of agent 1 in the planner problem, θ. the founder when he reports a low taste shock. Notice that this line is above one for low relative weights and it is equal to one for relative weights larger than 0.6. The fact that it is greater than one means that, under private information, this consumption is larger than what it would be with full information. This should be interpreted together with the red dashed line: The consumption of the founder after he reported a high taste shock. This consumption ratio is smaller than one for low relative weights and equal to one for relative weights larger than 0.6. This implies that consumption under private information is lower than with full information if agent 1 reports a high taste shock. Together, these patterns show that under private information the founder's consumption does not react as much as to the taste shock as under full information. This happens because, to make this report compatible with incentives, the founder gets more when his report is low and less when it is high, compared with the economy with full information.
To illustrate the model further we generated a sequence of shocks and plotted the optimal reaction of both the full information and private information economy. At period zero we initialized the values of the state variables-θ and k-at the same values in the economy with full information and private information. Then, we plotted the evolution of each variable in the economy with private information relative to its counterpart in the economy with full information. The left panel of Figure 4 displays the sequence of shock and the right panel Notice the sequence of shocks chosen has predominantly low shocks. We should expect to see that the founder is rewarded for truthfully reporting this shock. This is actually what we see in the right panel of Figure 4 . Notice that during all the periods in this figure the consumption of the founder in the economy with private information is larger than in the economy with full information (green-dotted line is above one). This happens because in the economy with private information there is history dependence, shown by the fact that the relative Pareto weights of agent 1 (red-dashed line) are above one after a sequence of reports of low shocks. Notice that the higher consumption of the founder in the economy with private information relative to the economy with full information is compensated by a the oppositive behavior in the consumption of agent 2. However, not just consumption but also capital accumulation is modified under private information. In particular, the stock of capital is increasing more in the economy with private information in the periods when agent 1 reports a low shock. As we will see more clearly below, this happens because altering capital accumulation is also used to provide incentives.
Too big to cheat
It was shown in the theoretical characterization that if the relative Pareto weight of agent 1 is too large, he doesn't have incentive to cheat. Figure 5 shows the multiplier in the incentive compatibility constraint as a function of the relative Pareto weight of the founder. As the weight of agent 1 increases, the multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint also increases, indicating that relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint would increase the objective function more and more. However, when the value of the relative Pareto weight is around 0.38, the multiplier peaks and starts to decrease, reaching zero when the weight is around 0.56. From there and on, relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint doesn't increase welfare: private information doesn't matter! To understand this result, it is important to notice that the increase in consumption of the founder after reporting a high taste shock is not fully financed with redistribution (a reduction in consumption of the other agent), another fraction is financed with disinvestment. Figure 6 displays the share of the increase in the consumption of the founder after reporting a high shock that is financed with a reduction in capital accumulation. The key is that this share is increasing in the relative Pareto weight of the founder. Notice that the founder's incentives for misreporting come from the fact that he can take resources from the other partner. Thus, the reduction in the future stock of capital after a report of a high shock provides incentive for truthful revelation. Now, if disinvestment is useful to provide incentives, we should see more disinvestment in the economy with private information-see Figure 7 .
The share financed with disinvestment in the economy with private information is higher than in the full information economy, as shown in Figure 7 . This implies that the allocation of capital is distorted by the presence of private information: Every time the founder reports a high shock, investment decreases more in the economy with private information than in the economy with full information because this helps to provide incentives for truthful revelation.
The ownership structure of partnership in the long-run
The relative Pareto weights capture the ownership structure of the partnership. It was shown in the theoretical section that the ownership structure varies over time in the economy with private information. This raises the question: what happen with the ownership structure in the long run? Figure 8 shows the two opposite cases. In the left panel, the share of agent 1 converges to zero. This implies that the ownership is concentrated in agent 2. In the right panel, the share of agent 1 reaches 0.56. At that point, the equity share of agent 1 is large enough that the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind. From there and on, the equity share is constant. Which case is realized depends on the realization of shocks and the initial conditions. Table 2 shows that when the initial share of agent 1 is 0.28, the economy converges to the "too big to cheat" region 31 percent of the time if the initial capital is low and 25 percent if the initial capital is high. These number are substantially higher if the initial share in 0.48, indicating that the value of the initial share is more important than the value of capital in determining the long-run ownership structure. Figure 9 characterizes the ergodic set in the space of the state variables: capital and the share of agent 1. This is the region where the state variables don't leave the region once they enter. In line with Figure 8 , there are actually two regions. The most clear is the dashed region with the share of agent 1 between 0.56 and 1: the "too big to cheat region." Anywhere in that region the share stays constant but the capital stock fluctuates in between the boundaries. But there is another region that contains exactly one point in the state space: the share of agent 1 at 0 and capital at 2.15. In this second region the capital stock is constant because only agent 1 has a shock and his weight is zero.
Discussion of Main Assumptions
This section discusses the role of the main assumption in the analysis above.
Production vs. Endowment Economy
What is the role of capital accumulation? To answer this question we study the same economy as above but assume that the resources available every periods are given (an endowment ergodic set economy). The level of endowment is set at the output produced at the mean of the steadystate level of capital in the production economy to facilitate the comparison between the endowment and production economy. Figure 10 shows the value of the multiplier in the incentive compatibility constraint in both the production and the endowment economy. The solid blue line is the multiplier in the production economy. As discussed before, it starts to decrease when the relative weight of agent 1 increases and eventually is zero. This means that the full information allocation is actually implementable under private information. The red dashed line represents the value of the multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint in the endowment economy. Remarkably, it is increasing in the relative weight of agent 1 in the interval [0, 1) and drops abruptly to zero when the weight is one.
If the value of the multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint is different in an endowment economy, one may expect the allocation of consumption to change too. Figure 11 displays, for both the endowment and production economy, the consumption in the economy with private information relative to the consumption in the economy with full information.
The solid lines (blue and red) correspond to the production economy. As discussed above, for a large enough relative Pareto weight, the consumptions of agent 1 and 2 coincide in the economy with private and full information. This is not true in the case of the endowment economy, as shown by the dashed lines. These lines show that in the endowment economy consumption is more distorted. This confirms our intuition that investment plays a key role to provide incentives. 
One Agent with Shock vs. Two Agents with Shocks
How would the long-run predictions change if both agents face taste shocks? To answer this question, we solved the full information problem for the economy with two agents facing uncorrelated taste shocks. Then, we constructed the regions in which the incentive compatibility constraint would not be binding for that allocation. This allow us to replicate the analysis in Figure 9 but for this economy. As shown in Figure 12 , in this case there are three ergodic sets: (1) agent 1's equity share is zero and agent 2's equity share is too big to cheat, (2) agent 2's equity share is zero and agent 1's equity share is too big to cheat, and (3) both agents' shares are too big to cheat, which happens when the ownership is close to equally distributed among the partners (the agent's 1 relative weight is about one half). This result is very intuitive. When both agents face privately observed shocks, to obtain our result that private information doesn't matter, it must be the case that both share holders are too big to cheat. This requires that the ownership is (close) to equally distributed among the partners. Notice also that, if one adds more and more partners even with a perfectly equally distributed ownership, it would be harder and harder to obtain the "too big to cheat" result obtained in region (3) here. Thus, our result is also related to Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) , who show that having a dispersed ownership structure helps in terms of liquidity provision but also creates incentive problems.
Discrete vs. Continuous Taste Shocks
The other important assumption in our framework is that the shock is discrete; the support of the shock is s L and s H . The main mechanism at work here is the fact that with a few agents and a production economy, as the share of one agent in the partnership increases, there is a force that makes his incentives to misrepresent the shock decline. We argue that the same mechanism would be at work even if the shock's support is continuous and the agent could tell a "marginal lie." To see this, it is useful to consider the case in which the shock s has a continuous support between s L and s H in the production and endowment economy. First, as we showed, in the production economy, reporting s H when the realized shock is actually s L is eventually not beneficial as the Pareto weight increases. The agent may want to tell a smaller lie at that point. Suppose it is s ∈ (s L , s H ). Again, there will be a Pareto weight at which reporting s when s L is realized is not beneficial. In fact, our theoretical result implies that for any s > s L , there is a relative Pareto weight smaller than one at which the multiplier is zero.
Thus, when the relative Pareto weight is in the neighborhood of 1, it must be that the only lie an agent will consider is marginal.
6 Importantly, this is not true on the case of an endowment economy. The assumption of an endowment economy implies that the resources available next period are independent of reports today. The full information solution implies that the Pareto weight next period is independent of the report and current consumption is increasing in the reported shock. Therefore, it is easy to see that in the endowment economy the agent with privately observed taste shock s L will always want to tell the largest possible lie, s H , if the full information policy rules would be used to allocate consumption. The contrast between incentive in an endowment and production economy is the emphasis here. And this is independent of the assumption about the shock being discrete or continuous.
Conclusion
There has been a tradition in economics of analyzing risk sharing under private information.
Little was known about the role of capital accumulation. The main impediments to study the efficient allocation under private information in a production economy was tractability. We propose a new recursive method that is applied to the analysis of risk sharing in partnership. In our framework, there are two partners in a venture that share the stock of capital and must allocate resources to consumption of each partner and investment. One of the agents (the founder) is subject to a taste shock that is privately observed. The other agent (the partner) does not face shocks and thus can potentially alleviate fluctuations in the needs of consumption of the founder. In the optimal allocation, the ownership structure is crucial to determine the role of private information. If the equity share of the founder is big enough, the first best allocation can be implemented even under private information.
A numerical example illustrates some features of the optimal arrangement. Whenever the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, consumption increases less for the agent with the high taste shock in the economy with private information compared with the full information economy. Moreover, in the transition to the steady state, history dependence in the economy with private information implies variations in equity shares that generate changes in investment and consumption of both agents.
In the long run, there are two possible steady states. Which one will prevail depends on the sequence of shocks realized and the initial conditions of the partnership. This economy may converge to the full information allocation with both agents having a strictly positive equity share. This happens because a sequence of low taste shocks would increase the share of agent 1 in the firm up to the point in which the first best allocation is actually incentive compatible.
We discuss the role of key assumptions. It turns out that the results depend on the fact that we are studying private information in a production economy, instead of in an endowment economy. Having only one agent facing a privately observed shock simplifies the analysis but does not affect the economic insights of this paper.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the number of partners and the ownership structure in venture are important for determining the extent of the private information friction. When there are fewer partners with large share in the partnerships, they partially internalize the cost of misreporting the shock on capital accumulation. This helps in overcoming the problem of private information.
F i K(z t−1 (s t−1 )), 1 + (1 − δ) K(z t−1 (s t−1 ))
F i K i (z t−1 (s t−1 )), 1 + (1 − δ) K(z t−1 (s t−1 ))
F K λ (z t−1 (s t−1 )), 1 + (1 − δ)K λ (z t−1 (s t−1 )) where K 0 = K. Consequently, we can conclude that λw + (1 − λ) w ∈ Ψ(K).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Lucas and Stokey (1984) .
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Take 
Since h is preserved under T , we have that where the first inequality holds since h ∈ F H and (9) while the last one follows from the Dominated Convergence Theorem and β ∈ (0, 1). Notice that ( v, k ′ ) is sequentially feasible by construction. Now we argue that it is incentive compatible as well. To see this, denote recursively W i,t (s t ) = w
